Robin L. Hough v. Joel E. Colley : Petition for Rehearing by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Robin L. Hough v. Joel E. Colley : Petition for
Rehearing
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
B. L. Dart; Dart, Adamson & Kasting; Attorneys for Respondent.
J. Thomas Bowen; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Hough v. Colley, No. 880123 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/903
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. fttotz&nfta 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Case No. 880123-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Orme< 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER 
District Judge 
BERT L. DART #818 
Dart, Adamson & Kasting 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
CSalt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
J. THOMAS BOWEN #0396 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent 
F I L E D 
JUL p,7nm 
'•to* Oiins
 t<aj 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
Case No. 880123-CA 
Before Judges Bench, Garff and Orme. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER 
District Judge 
BERT L. DART #818 
Dart, Adamson & Kasting 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
CSalt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
J. THOMAS BOWEN #0396 
1020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 11 
TEXTS ii 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REHEARING 1 
POINT I THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT MISS 
HOUGH'S OLIGATION WAS LIMITED TO "TIME 
AND TALENTS" BUT THAT DR. COLLEY HAD 
THE ENTIRE FINANCIAL BURDEN 2 
A. The plaintiff herself did not 
contend that her obligation to 
the partnership was limited to 
time and talent only 3 
B. Miss Hough's obligation did not 
change 4 
C. Miss Hough breached the terms of 
the agreement 5 
POINT II A DISTRIBUTION OF A PORTION OF THE 
CAPITAL ASSETS OF THE PARTNERHIP 
BASED UPON PLAINTTIFF'S TIME, TALENT 
AND SERVICES IS ERROR 
CONCLUSION 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
PAGE 
Bass v. Daetwyler, 
305 S.W.2d 399 (Mo. 1957) 8 
Baum v. McBride, 
152 Neb. 152, 40 N.W.2d 649 (1950) 8 
Hunter v. Allen, 
174 Or. 261, 147 P.2d 213 7 
Schymanski v. Conventz, 
674 P.2d 281 (Alaska 1983) 7 
Tiffany v. Short, 
22 Cal. 2d 531, 139 P. 2d 939 (1943) 7 
Vassalo v. Sexauer, 
22 Mich. App. 188, 177 N.W.2d 470 (1970) 8 
TEXTS 
1 S. Rowley on partnerships (2d ed. 1960) 7 
i 
1 1
 i 
( 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROBIN L. HOUGH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
JOEL E. COLLEY, 
Defendant and Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 880123-CA 
Before Judges Bench/ Garff and Orme. 
* * * * * * * * 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, Joel E. Colley petitions the Court for a 
rehearing on the issues set forth hereafter. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REHEARING 
ISSUE 1; There is no evidence to support the 
trial court's finding number 6 that "it was understood and 
agreed that the plaintiff would devote all her time and 
talents to the property and defendant would contribute 
money, but that both would share on an equal basis", and 
ISSUE 2: A distribution to Miss Hough, other than 
profits from the partnership, based upon her rendition only 
of services, is contrary to the facts of the case and 
contrary to the law. 
I 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT MISS HOUGH'S OBLIGATION WAS LIMITED 
TO "TIME AND TALENTS" BUT THAT DR. COLLEY HAD 
THE ENTIRE FINANCIAL BURDEN 
Defendant does still not know when or where the 
partnership between himself and Miss Hough arouse; the 
opinion of this court provides no guidance on that matter. 
Nevertheless, this court having determined that there is 
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's decision 
that a partnership in fact existed, defendant does not con-
test that determination further. Critical, however, to the 
trial court's scheme of distribution, which this court 
affirmed, was its finding number 6 that Miss Hough's obliga-
tion to the partnership was only to provide services but 
that Dr. Colley had the entire financial burden. This is 
not an issue upon which there is disputed evidence; rather, 
there is no evidence in the record to support this critical 
finding by the trial court. This court erred, therefore, in 
concluding that there was "substantial competent evidence" 
to support that finding. In deed, neither this court, nor 
Miss Hough's counsel have been able to cite to any evidence 
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in the record that supports that finding by Judge Conder. 
In her brief, Miss Hough merely restated the trial court's 
finding and then argued that since the court had made that 
finding there must have been evidence to support it; how-
ever, Miss Hough provided no reference to any specific 
facts, nor any citation to the record, that would support 
that finding* This court, similarly, appeared to gloss over 
that pivitol finding and apparently concluded that since 
there was evidence to support the trial court's finding of a 
partnership the other related finding must also be correct. 
Defendant submits, however, that such is not the case. The 
notion that Miss Hough had no financial obligation to the 
partnership was erroneously created by the trial court with-
out any support in the evidence or record of this case. Dr. 
Colley admits that the trial court did, in fact, make its 
finding number 6 but that finding is totally unsupportable 
by the record. Dr. Colley requests, therefore, that this 
court rehear that matter. 
A. The plaintiff herself did not contend that her 
obligation to the partnership was limited to time and talent 
only. Even Miss Hough herself, did not contend that her 
obligation to the partnership was limited to her time and 
talents only. She testified that her obligation included a 
financial commitment. Referring to the time the parties 
were in Texas, plaintiff testified: 
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"We both contributed everything. We 
contributed all of our finances/ we contri-
buted all of our time, all of our talent, all 
of our efforts." R. Vol. I. p. 41 (emphasis 
added). 
Plaintiff testified that their relationship in Pennsylvania 
also included a financial commitment. Miss Hough stated: 
"It was our understanding, that all of 
our efforts, our financial efforts, our 
physical efforts, our intellectual efforts 
were to be combined so that we — our unit 
could grow." T. Vol. I, p. 55 (emphasis 
added). 
Regarding their association in Utah, Miss Hough testified: 
"We committed 100% of everything, our 
finances, our mental, physical, emotional ef-
forts up to the time that we separated. We 
still had a tremendous amount of contact after 
that up until November, 1982 and still a lot 
of financial involvement, talking, but the 
combination was not what it had been prior to 
our separation. Prior to our separation it 
was 100%. T. Vol. I. p. 175-176 (emphasis 
added). 
Plaintiff also stated that: 
"We combined all of our income into our 
accounts, and all of our efforts, all of our 
energies into a common pool." T. Vol. I. p. 
144 (emphasis added). 
Plaintiff freely admitted that her agreement with Dr. Colley 
required her to contribute not only her time and talents but 
also all of her finances to their association. Plaintiff's 
own testimony is clearly contrary to the trial court's 
finding number 6. 
B. Miss Hough's obligation did not change. There 
can be no contention that Miss Hough's obligation to contri-
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bute money to the partnership ever changed. When asked, 
"Did the agreement ever change so far as you understood it?" 
Miss Hough responded, "Never." T. Vol. I. p. 44. According 
to plaintiff, she had an obligation to contribute not only 
her time, efforts, and talents, but also her money to the 
association. Also, according to plaintiff, that obligation 
never changed; therefore, the court's finding number 6 that 
plaintiff's obligation somehow did change and that defendant 
somehow became solely obligated to put up all of the money 
while plaintiff was relieved from her obligation to contri-
bute her finances but only had to provide "time and talent", 
is clearly contrary to the testimony of both of the parties 
in this matter and is, contrary to this court's conclusion, 
totally unsupported by the evidence. 
C. Miss Hough breached the terms of the agreement. 
The parties ceased residing together on October 30, 1981. 
Thereafter, the record is undisputed that Miss Hough com-
pletely abandoned her commitment to Dr. Colley and to the 
properties. After the parties separated Dr. Colley advanced 
ONE HUNDRED FORTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN 
DOLLARS ($146,247), for the purpose of preserving the prop-
erty. T. Vol. II. p. 172-173, (Ex. 110). During that time 
Dr. Colley also performed all of the management duties for 
the properties; plaintiff performed none. After October 30, 
1981, Miss Hough paid only FORTY TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS 
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($4,200) for property maintenance, T, Vol. II. p. 173, The 
fact that Miss Hough paid even that miserly amount shows, 
nevertheless, that she recognized a financial obligation to 
Dr, Colley and to the properties. During that same period 
of time Miss Hough devoted none of her time or talents to 
the properties; rather, she used them, and her money, to 
acquire assets in her own name. See pp. 24-28 of 
Appellant's Brief. The trial court held that the partner-
ship was actually terminated upon trial of the case 
(February, 1985) some 3-1/2 years after the parties separat-
ed. It is undisputed that Dr. Colley continued to utilize 
his funds for the maintenance and preservation of the prop-
erty while at the same time, Miss Hough turned her back on 
the properties and directed her efforts toward her own per-
sonal gain. It seems clear, therefore, that even the most 
generous reading of the trial court's findings shows that 
Miss Hough violated the terms of the agreement she had with 
Dr. Colley and that for 3-1/2 years she did not even devote 
her time or talents to the partnership. 
II 
A DISTRIBUTION OF A PORTION OF THE CAPITAL 
ASSETS OF THE PARTNERSHIP BASED UPON PLAINTIFF'S 
TIME, TALENT AND SERVICES IS ERROR 
If Miss Hough is entitled to a distribution from 
the partnership, she is entitled to a share of the profits 
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only after Dr. Colley's capital contributions have been re-
turned to him. It has been stated: 
Where one partner has contributed 
capital and the other services, the one con-
tributing the capital is entitled to withdraw 
its value. 1 S. Rowley on Partnerships (2d 
ed. 1960) p. 453. 
Under some circumstances personal services may constitute a 
capital contribution to a partnership; however, there must 
be a specific agreement to that effect; otherwise, a partner 
who contributes services is not entitled to share in the 
capital upon dissolution. Schymanski v. Conventz, 674 P.2d 
281 (Alaska 1983). There is no evidence of the required 
specific agreement in this case. As has been noted else-
where: 
A partner contributing only services and 
no capital, is ordinarily entitled to no share 
of capital on dissolution, the capital is re-
turned to the partner supplying it. Tiffany 
v. Short, 22 Cal. 2d 531, 139 P.2d 939 (1943). 
The partner contributing only services is limited to his 
share of the profits of the enterprise as compensation for 
his services. Hunter v. Allen, 174 Or. 261, 147 P.2d 213, 
modified on other grounds, 148 P.2d 936, (1944). 
Generally where one partner contributes the capital 
of the firm while another contributes skill and labor, the 
partner who made the capital contribution is entitled, on 
dissolution, to repayment of such capital before any distri-
bution of profits is made. A partner who furnishes no 
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capital/ but contributes merely time, skill and services, is 
not entitled on dissolution to any part of the original firm 
capital, but must look for compensation for such time and 
services to a share of the profits. Vassallo v. Sexauer, 22 
Mich. App. 188, 177 N.W.2d 470 (1970); Bass v. Daetwyler, 
305 S.W.2d 339 (Mo. 1957); Baum v. McBride, 152 Neb. 152, 40 
N.W.2d 649 (1950). 
In the instant case, the trial court failed to 
require an accounting between the parties and also failed to 
determine whether or not there were any profits to distri-
bute. The trial court's distribution scheme was, apparent-
ly, based upon its finding number 6 that plaintiff's obliga-
tion was limited merely to time and services. In any event, 
the trial court failed to properly apply the law since Miss 
Hough's distribution from the partnership, based upon time 
and services, should have been limited to profits from the 
partnership only and not to capital contributions. If find-
ing number 6 is upheld, Miss Hough would only be entitled to 
a share of the profits. If Miss Hough's obligation to con-
tribute financially to the partnership is recognized then 
there cannot be a distribution without a proper accounting. 
As it now stands, however, Miss Hough has received the best 
of both worlds; a portion of the partnership's capital with-
out an obligation to contribute to that capital. Defendant 
submits that this is error and is contrary to the evidence 
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of this case and that this court erred in sustaining the 
trial court on that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
This court erred in determining that the trial 
courtfs finding number 6, that plaintiff would devote all 
her time and talents to the property and defendant would 
contribute money but that both would share on an equal 
basis, is supported by competent evidence in the record. 
Similarly, the distribution scheme that allowed Miss Hough 
to receive not only one-half of the profits, but also one-
half of all of the capital contributed, is contrary to 
partnership law. Defendant requests, therefore, a rehearing 
based upon the issues presented in this petition. 
DATED this ^? T^aay of July, 1988. 
---LJm JU&^ 
J. THOMAS BOWEN' 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent 
I certify that the foregoing Petition is presented in 
good faith and not for delay. 
J. THOMAS BOWEN 
19.4 
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I, hereby certify that on the day of July, 1988, 
I caused four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing, 
PETITION FOR REHEARING, to be served, by delivering the same by 
hand to: 
Bert L. Dart 
Dart, Adamson & Kasting 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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